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Abstract:  
We build a Dynamic General Equilibrium model with search frictions for the allocation 
of physical capital and investigate its implications for the business cycle. While the 
model is in principle capable of generating substantial internal propagation to small 
exogenous shocks, the quantitative effects are modest once we calibrate the model 
to fit firm-level capital flows. We then extend the model with credit market frictions 
that lead to countercyclical default and countercyclical risk premia as in the data. 
Countercyclical default directly affects capital reallocation and has important general 
equilibrium income effects on labor supply. Yet, for calibrations in line with observed 
consumption dynamics, we find that even in this extended model, search frictions in 
physical capital markets play only a small role for business cycle fluctuations. 
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1 Introduction
Physical capital is often specic to a certain task and/or xed to a particular location. These
specicities imply that physical capital markets are subject to potentially important allocation
frictions. Most of the modern macro literature has ignored these market imperfections and
examined instead the e¤ects of aggregate investment constraints such as time-to-build delays (e.g.
Kydland and Prescott, 1982) or convex adjustment costs (e.g. Cogley and Nason, 1995). The
general conclusion from this literature is that in general equilibrium, such aggregate investment
constraints have relatively small business cycle e¤ects on their own. In this paper, we investigate
whether the same holds true for market imperfections. In particular, we introduce search frictions
for the allocation of physical capital into an otherwise standard real business cycle (RBC) model
and ask whether these imperfections help generate more amplied and persistent responses to
small exogenous shocks.
Our investigation is motivated by empirical evidence from industry- and rm-level data,
discussed in detail in Section 2, that lead to three stylized observations. First, depending on
the degree of specicity, a substantial amount of physical capital remains unmatched in any
given period. Second, congestion in the physical capital market is countercyclical from the
point of view of the supplier; i.e. the probability of (re-)allocating a given unit of capital to
a rm increases in business cycle upturns and inversely decreases in downturns. Third, the
distribution of investment rates across individual rms is wide, even in narrowly dened sectors
and independent of aggregate conditions. The three observations suggest that physical capital
markets are characterized by similar frictions than labor markets and thus, our modelization
draws on the now widely employed search approach for the labor market, pioneered by Blanchard
and Diamond (1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and introduced into the DGE context
by Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996) and Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
The model we develop in Section 3 is populated by representative households and rms.
Firms must post projects at a cost to search for available physical capital that is supplied
endogenously by households.1 The probability of a match varies with the state of the economy
1As opposed to most labor search models where the supply of available workers is xed, we endogenize the
supply of available capital for the model to be consistent with balanced growth properties of aggregate capital
stocks.
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and depends on the ratio of available capital to the total number of posted projects. Once
matched, households keep lending their capital to the same rm until separation, which is
assumed to occur with exogenous probability in the baseline model. Once separated, the capital
returns to the household for reallocation.
Under relatively weak conditions, the proposed search environment implies countercyclical
congestion in physical capital markets, as in the data. This mechanism has potentially important
aggregate consequences. In the wake of a positive technology shock, for example, the decrease in
allocation frictions together with the presence of readily available unmatched capital means that
the reaction of productive matched capital stocks and indirectly labor demand is more important
than in the RBC benchmark. This e¤ect continues over several periods after the shock and may
lead to more amplied and persistent output dynamics.
To assess the quantitative importance of the search friction, Section 4 calibrates the model to
t long-run averages of rm-level capital ows using Compustat data and compares its business
cycle characteristics with the ones of the RBC benchmark. The main result is that capital ows
in and out of production are not important enough for search frictions to have a signicant
impact. Only when we increase separation and reallocation to counterfactually large ows does
the model generate more amplied and persistent output dynamics.
Based on this result, Section 5 extends the baseline model with credit market frictions.
Following Townsend (1979), rms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks that occur
after all optimal decisions are taken and that households (the lenders) can observe only after
incurring a monitoring cost. This costly state verication problem implies an optimal debt
contract that results in endogenous capital separation through default. In particular, households
monitor all loss-making rms and sever the lending relationship with those whose productivity
level is below some threshold that makes renancing more expensive than reallocating the capital
to another rm.
The extension is motivated by the observation that di¤erent measures of nancial distress
and related capital sales / liquidations are countercyclical. Similar to Den Haan, Ramey and
Watsons (2000) argument that countercyclical job destruction generates substantial internal
propagation in labor search models, countercyclical capital separations in our model may magnify
and prolong the e¤ects of exogenous shocks as more (less) capital gets separated in downturns
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(upturns) and needs to go through a time-consuming reallocation process.2 As an interesting
by-product, the extended model also allows us to assess the importance of taking into account
costly capital reallocation when quantifying the business cycle e¤ects of credit frictions. In
fact, existing DGE models with costly state verication such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) or
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) only investigate the e¤ects of net worth on investment
and output but ignore the reallocation of capital from bankrupt rms. With the exception of a
few special cases, these net worth e¤ects alone have relatively small consequences for business
cycle uctuations. It is therefore interesting to see how the addition of costly capital reallocation
changes this result.3
As the quantitative analysis reveals, the extended model indeed generates countercyclical
capital separations as well as countercyclical risk premia, in line with the data. This latter result
constitutes an improvement over the credit friction models of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) where risk premia are either procyclical or acyclical.4 The
extended model also implies more volatile and persistent output uctuations. Closer inspection
reveals, however, that the increased internal propagation is mostly a general equilibrium e¤ect
brought about by a smaller (or even inverse) reaction of household consumption and thus labor
supply to exogenous shocks. Once we calibrate the model such as to match the consumption
dynamics in the data, the extended model implies only modest amplication and persistence.
The conclusion of the paper thus remains that capital separation and reallocation ows on their
own are too small for search frictions in physical capital markets to play an important role for
business cycle uctuations.
The results of our paper mostly concur with existing studies on the business cycle e¤ects of
physical capital specicities. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), for example, examine the aggregate
e¤ects of large military spending shocks in a world where moving capital from one sector to
2By contrast to Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) where job destruction is an e¢ cient outcome, capital
separations in our model are the consequence of an information friction and thus socially ine¢ cient. As we discuss
in Section 5, this assumption is based on rm-level evidence indicating that capital separations due to (presumably
e¢ cient) sales and mergers are mildly procyclical rather than countercyclical.
3Section 5 provides more details about the business cycle e¤ects of the net worth channel of credit frictions.
4As we discuss in Section 5, the countercyclical risk premium is a direct consequence of the time-varying
costs of incomplete contracting in a world with ex-post factor specicity that Willamson (1979) or more recently
Caballero and Hammour (1996) term the fundamental transformation problem.
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another is subject to a time-delay and a xed cost. For certain specications, they report some
output amplication e¤ects. However, these e¤ects are based on unusually important sectoral
shifts and the model is not analyzed in a full-blown DGE context. Boldrin, Christiano and
Fisher (2001), in turn, consider a model with habit persistence and one-period inexibilities for
both labor and capital. While their focus is mostly on asset pricing implications, their model
is capable of generating substantial persistence in output growth. However, this result seems
to be due mostly to the imposed adjustment delay on hours worked. Finally, Veracierto (2002)
examines the e¤ects of investment irreversibilities and concludes that they do not matter for
the business cycle.5 The main contribution of our paper compared to these studies is that
we focus more squarely on the time-varying nature of the market imperfections involved in
the allocation of physical capital. First, we document that congestion in the physical capital
market is countercyclical. Second, we introduce search frictions to capture the state-dependent
nature of this congestion and show that it has interesting consequences in general equilibrium,
mostly through its indirect e¤ect on labor supply.6 Third, we are, to our knowledge, the rst
to explicitly calibrate a DGE model to gross capital ows from rm-level data. The relative
unimportance of these capital ows (compared to, say, labor ows) is the main reason for our
conclusion that search frictions in physical capital markets play only a modest role for business
cycle uctuations.
2 Empirical evidence
To motivate our extension of the RBC benchmark, this section rst provides evidence on the
time-varying nature of market imperfections in the allocation and reallocation of physical capital.
Second, we review empirical studies on the wide distribution of investment rates across rms.
5A recent literature examines the role of nonconvexities in plant-level adjustment costs for aggregate investment
dynamics, which can be considered as a combination of costs to both allocation of new capial and reallocation
of used capital. See for example Kahn and Thomas (2006a) and the references therein. As in Veracierto (2002),
these costs are found to have only small general equilibrium e¤ects.
6Related to our model, Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004) propose search
frictions for the allocation of nancing from lenders to rms. While relevant for new entrepreneurs and small
rms, such frictions seem less obvious for large rms that account for the bulk of capital accumulation in the
economy. Furthermore, their analysis is not carried out in a full-blown quantitative DGE context.
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2.1 Allocation frictions for physical capital
Most physical capital is specic to a certain task and/or xed to a particular location. The
market imperfections brought about by these specicities are likely to imply substantial costs
for the allocation and reallocation of physical capital. Similar to the labor market, one can think
of these costs as search frictions that depend on the degree of specicity and potentially vary with
business conditions. Unlike for the labor market where we observe aggregate unemployment and
job advertisement rates, however, there is no comprehensive direct evidence on unemployed
capital or unlled investment projects.7 Nevertheless, a substantial amount of indirect evidence
exists that allows at least a partial characterization of the frictions involved.
We start by considering the market for leased non-residential property, which is one of the
capital types most comparable to labor in the sense that similar to unemployment, vacant
space is directly observable. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average U.S. vacancy rate for
industrial and o¢ ce space in competitively leased multi-tenant buildings between 1988 and 2006.
We obtained these data series from Torto Wheaton Richard Ellis, a large commercial real estate
rm that surveys all major U.S. property markets on a quarterly basis.
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Figure 1: Vacancy rate for multi-tenant industrial and o¢ ce space; average over 56 metropolitan U.S.
markets. Source: Torto Wheaton Richard Ellis.
Vacancies were at a record high at the end of the 1990-1992 recession, with the rate for o¢ ce
space approaching 20%. Vacancies then gradually decreased over the rest of the 1990s before
7See Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006) for a recent survey of the relevant data for labor markets.
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jumping up again at the onset of the 2001 recession. On average, these vacancy rates are
substantial (9.5% for industrial space and 14.5% for o¢ ce space) and their time-varying nature
suggests that congestion in the non-residential property market (from the point of view of the
proprietor) varies inversely with the business cycle.8
Industrial and o¢ ce space is, of course, a very specic type of capital because it is bound
to a particular location and can hardly be converted for alternative usage. On the other end
of the spectrum are newly nished, relatively mobile capital goods. Here, the BEAs Survey of
Current Business (2000) allows us to observe detailed time series on inventories and output from
capital goods producing industries. Using this information, we can compute the hazard rate qit
with which a new unit of capital good i is allocated as follows:
vit = (1  qit)(vit 1 + yit),
with vit and yit denoting end-of-period t inventories and output during period t of capital good
i, respectively. Table 1 reports the results for three large categories of nished capital goods
over the sample 1977 to 1999.
Table 1: Allocation rates of nished capital goods
Average q corr(qt; gdpt)
Industrial machinery and equipment 0.70 0.40
Motor vehicles and equipment 0.83 0.16
Electronic and other electric equipment 0.90 0.16
Average 0.86 0.36
Notes: Second moments relate to Hodrick-Prescott ltered data
As expected, the allocation rate for these capital goods is closer to unity (no friction) as
production can be adjusted to accommodate demand and none of the capital types is bound
to a specic location. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that industrial machinery 
presumably a more specic capital good takes on average longer to be allocated (i.e. a lower
8Unfortunately, Torto Wheaton does not provide information on newly vacated space and, to our knowledge,
none of the U.S. statistical agencies provides comparable data on the non-residential property market. Hence, we
cannot compute hazard rates for the transition out of vacancy as it possible for the labor market where we have
separate time series on newly unemployed individuals (e.g. Shimer, 2005).
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q) and congestion in that market reacts more inversely with the business cycle (i.e. the allocation
rate q is more procyclical).9
Aside from these direct measures, there is a host of indirect evidence about the importance
and the countercyclical nature of the frictions in physical capital markets, especially what the
reallocation of used capital is concerned. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), for example, use Com-
pustat data to show that reallocation of used capital (measured as sales of plant, property
and equipment plus acquisitions as a fraction of gross investment) is highly procyclical, with a
Hodrick-Prescott ltered correlation coe¢ cient with GDP of 0.64 for the sample 1971-2004.10
By contrast, di¤erent measures of the benets from reallocation (dispersion in rm level Tobins
Q, rm level investment rates, total factor productivity growth rates, and capacity utilization)
are all countercyclical. If there were no reallocation frictions or if the degree of congestion in
the used capital market was constant, we would expect most reallocations to take place when
the benets are greatest. Yet, exactly the opposite is the case.
Another piece of indirect evidence about reallocation frictions for used capital comes from
a case study by Ramey and Shapiro (2001) who measure the resale value of equipment after
the closure of three aeronautical plants. They nd that other aerospace companies are overrep-
resented among buyers, and that even after taking into account age-related depreciation, the
average resale value of equipment is only 28% of the replacement cost.11 Although some of these
losses may be due to unaccounted obsoleteness, Ramey and Shapiros results suggest that the
frictions involved in the reallocation of used capital are substantial. Otherwise, the used capital
would not sell at such a large discount below its productive value.
9The traditional explanation for the existence of inventories relies on the assumption that production is costly
to adjust. As a result, rms use inventories to smooth production when faced with uctuating sales (e.g. Blinder
and Maccini, 1991). An alternative explanation relies on the existence of xed delivery costs, inciting rms
to hold inventory stocks. Firms thus make adjustments only when stocks are su¢ ciently far from their target
(e.g. Kahn and Thomas, 2006b). Our argument of congestion di¤ers from these explanations in the sense that we
interpret the variation in hazard rates for inventory exit across goods as evidence of di¤erent degrees of market
imperfections.
10Compustat collects a wide range of data, including information on physical capital, for all publicly traded
rms in the U.S. We discuss this dataset in more detail in the calibration part of Section 4.
11Even for machine tools, which typically have a better resale value than specialized aerospace equipment, the
resale value is only about 40% relative to the replacement cost.
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Besides market imperfections in general, the specicity embodied in most physical capital
can lead to an additional equilibrium e¤ect that Shleifer and Vishny (1992) call asset illiquidity
and that may explain part of the surprisingly low resale prices reported in Ramey and Shapiros
case study. Shleifer and Vishny argue that when rms sell assets or liquidate to meet nancial
constraints, the specic nature of capital means that the buyers who value these assets most
are likely to be rms in the same industry. But nancial distress often a¤ects industries as
a whole, which means that these buyers are likely to be nancially constrained as well. As a
result, the assets are sold at a steep discount within the same industry or to less constrained
industry outsiders who have a lower valuation because the characteristics of the sold asset are
suboptimal for their line of business or because they cannot value the asset appropriately.12
Pulvino (1998) provides evidence about the countercyclical nature of asset illiquidity from the
used aircraft market. Based on U.S. data of commercial aircraft transactions, Pulvino nds
that nancially constrained airlines sell aircrafts at a 14% discount to the average market price,
but that these discounts exist only in times when the airline industry is depressed and not
when it is booming. Furthermore, aircraft leasing institutions pay a discount of 30% during
industry recessions because they themselves value aircrafts much lower than the actual airlines
and because the risk associated with nding another lessee during recessions is much higher than
in upturns.
A nal, more aggregate piece of evidence about the frictions involved in the reallocation
of physical capital comes from Becker et al. (2005) who use data from the Annual Capital
Expenditure Survey (ACES). In existence since 1993, ACES is a representative dataset of U.S.
rms that can be used to compute the capital stock of rms that disappear, either because they
cease to be active or because they continue to operate under a di¤erent rm. The resulting series
of total separated capital can then be compared with the following years series of aggregate used
capital expenditures. For the period 1993-1999, the resulting ratio of separated capital to used
expenditures equals on average 64%, suggesting that reallocation frictions are substantial.13
12Ramey and Shapiro (2001) advance a telling example about a wind tunnel that was constructed to test
aeronautical parts at high air speeds and that was leased out afterwards to test bycicle helmet designs.
13As other datasets on capital expenditures, ACES comes with several caveats. See Becker et al. (2005) for
a detailed discussion. Also, the 64% absorption rate could be biased either upwards or downwards. On the one
hand, expenditures in used capital include assets sold by continuing rms, which makes the e¤ective absorption
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In sum, the evidence presented here leads us to the following two stylized characterizations of
physical capital markets. First, allocation frictions for physical capital can be sizable depending
on the degree of specicity of the capital good and whether it is new investment or a reallocation
to another rm. Second, congestion in the physical capital market varies inversely with the
business cycle; i.e it is more costly and time-consuming to (re-)allocate physical capital to a rm
in business cycle downturns than it is in upturns.
2.2 Distribution of investment rates across rms
Further evidence suggesting that the allocation of physical capital is probabilistic in nature
comes from the well-documented wide distribution of investment rates across rms. Studies
by Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), Doms and Dunne (1998), Cooper, Haltiwanger
and Power (1999) or Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) show that investment at the plant level is
characterized by a wide distribution. At any given point in time, there is a substantial mass
of establishments with zero investment that coexists with establishments that have investment
rates above 20% of their capital stock (i.e. investment spikes).14
Most of the literature has interpreted this large distribution of investment rates across estab-
lishments as the result of plant-specic productivity and non-convex adjustment costs that lead
to (S,s) type investment rules (e.g. Khan and Thomas, 2006a and references therein). While
this approach is certainly capable of rationalizing the observed data, the wide distribution of
investment rates even in narrowly dened sectors a¤ords another, potentially complementary
explanation; one that focuses on market imperfections in the allocation of physical capital. In
fact, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence suggesting that in expansionary periods, rms
face sometimes substantial di¢ culties in securing a reliable supplier of capital goods.15
rate for separated capital from rm death even lower. On the other hand, some of the separated capital may be
exported abroad in which case the e¤ective absorption rate is higher.
14Becker et al. (2005) reconrm these ndings in their summary using plant-level data from the Annual Survey
of Manufacturers (ASM).
15 Interestingly, Statistics Canada collects information on intended capital purchases in one of their rm-level
surveys that could be compared over time to actual expenditures. Unfortunately, this information is not publicly
available at the moment.
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3 Model
As in the frictionless RBC benchmark, our model is populated by two agents: rms that produce
using capital and labor; and households who decide on optimal consumption, leisure and invest-
ments in productive capital. But instead of instantaneous allocation, the matching of capital
from households with rms involves a costly and time-consuming search process. This search
process is in principle very similar to the standard labor search environment (e.g. Andolfatto,
1996), with the exception that we endogenize the supply of available capital. This complication
is necessary because depreciated capital needs to be replaced and, more importantly, because we
want our model to be consistent with the stylized fact that output and capital grow on average
at the same rate.
At the same time, our model retains a number of other simplications that facilitate compar-
ison with the RBC benchmark. First, there is no distinct sector for capital allocation. Instead,
households directly act as capital lenders. Second, the same matching friction applies to the
allocation of both new and used (i.e. previously separated) capital. This renders the analysis
considerably easier as we do not need to keep track of di¤erent types of capital. Third, produc-
tion is constant-returns-to-scale. Firms therefore choose the same optimal capital-labor ratio,
independent of rm size, which allows us to abstract from rm heterogeneity.
3.1 Search and matching in the capital market
Capital is either in a productive state or in a liquid state. We dene by Kt the capital stock that
enters the production function of a representative rm in period t. Liquid capital Lt, in turn, is
made up of two components: used capital that has been separated previously from other rms
and new capital made available by households.
To undertake investments, rms must post projects and search for liquid capital at cost  per
project. We denote by Vt the total number of posted projects in period t. Total capital additions
to production in period t is the result of a matching process m(Lt; Vt), with @m()=@Lt > 0 and
@m()=@Vt > 0: A rms probability to nd capital is therefore given by p(t) = m(Vt;Lt)Vt with
@p(t)=@t > 0, where t = LtVt is a measure of congestion in the physical capital market from the
households point of view (i.e. the capital supplier). Likewise, the probability of liquid capital
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being matched to a rm equals q(t) =
m(Vt;Lt)
Lt
with @q(t)=@t < 0.16 Firms and households
are assumed to be su¢ ciently small to take p(t) and q(t) as exogenous.
Capital matched to a rm in period t  1 enters production in period t. This match between
rm and capital continues into period t + 1 with probability (1   s) and so on for the periods
thereafter. Hence, the evolution of the capital stock is described by17
Kt+1 = (1  )(1  s)Kt +m(Lt; Vt). (1)
With probability s, the match is terminated, in which case a fraction ' net of depreciation  of
the capital is returned to the household; i.e. the household receives '(1  )sKt. The remainder
(1 ')(1  )sKt is a deadweight loss incurred during the separation process. Note that in this
baseline formulation of our model, we keep the separation rate s exogenous. In Section 5 below,
we introduce credit market frictions to endogenize the separation rate.
3.2 Firms and households
At the beginning of each period, rms and households observe exogenous aggregate technology
Xt. Given the existing capital stock Kt; the representative rm then posts new projects Vt at
unit cost  and hires labor Nt to produce output Yt with constant-returns-to-scale technology
Yt = f(XtNt;Kt), (2)
with fN , fK > 0 and fNN , fKK < 0. The resulting prot maximization problem is described by
J(Kt) = max
Nt;Vt

f(XtNt;Kt)  tKt  WtNt   Vt + Et
t+1
t
J(Kt+1)

s.t. Kt+1 = (1  )(1  s)Kt + p(t)Vt,
where t is the rental rate of capital; Wt is the wage per unit of labor; and Et
t+1
t
is the
discount factor of future cash ows. This discount factor is a function of the marginal utility of
consumption  because the rm transfers all prots to the households. The rm takes Wt and
t as exogenous. The exogeneity of Wt is a direct consequence of our assumption of competitive
16 In addition, to ensure that p(t) and q(t) are between 0 and 1, we require that m(Lt; Vt)  min[Lt; Vt]
17Since rm size is indeterminate, the separation rate s describes either the probability that a rm disappears
in a given period or the fraction of capital that gets separated from a given rm (aside from depreciation). In
either case, the evolution of the aggregate capital stock is described by (1).
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labor markets. The exogeneity of t, in turn, implies that rms do not internalize the e¤ects of
their capital stock on the marginal productivity of capital and thus on the negotiation of t (see
below).
The rst-order conditions of the optimization problem are
(Nt) : fN (XtNt;Kt) = wt (3)
(Vt) : Et
t+1
t
JK(Kt+1) =

p(t)
. (4)
Equation (3) is the standard labor demand. Equation (4) states that the expected discounted
marginal value of an additional unit of matched capital has to equal its average cost =p(t),
with the marginal value of an additional matched unit of capital JK(K) being dened as
JK(Kt) = fK(XtNt;Kt)  t + (1  )(1  s)Et
t+1
t
JK(Kt+1). (5)
This equation states that the value to the rm of an additional unit of capital is worth to-
days marginal product of capital net of the rental rate plus the expected future value net of
depreciation in case the match is continued.
Households maximize the expected discounted ow of utility u(Ct; 1 Nt) over consumption
Ct, leisure 1  Nt and the amount of liquid capital Lt destined for matching with rms. Time
spent working yields revenue WtNt, capital matched last period yields revenue tKt, while
unmatched capital is carried into the present period with zero net return. Formally, this problem
is described by
V (Ut;Kt) = max
Ct;Nt;Lt
[u(Ct; 1 Nt) + EtV (Ut+1;Kt+1)]
+ t[WtNt + tKt + '(1  )sKt + Ut +Dt   Ct   Lt]
s.t. Kt+1 = (1  )(1  s)Kt + q(t)Lt
where Ut = (1   q(t 1))Lt 1 is the quantity of unmatched capital in the beginning of t; Dt
are rm prots transferred to households, and '(1   )sKt is the amount of separated capital
returned into the budget constraint. Similar to the rms optimization problem, we assume that
the household considers Wt and t as exogenous.
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The rst-order conditions of the optimization problem are
(Ct) : uC(Ct; 1 Nt) = t (6)
(Nt) : uN (Ct; 1 Nt) = tWt (7)
(Lt) : Et[VU (Ut+1;Kt+1)(1  q(t)) + VK(Ut+1;Kt+1)q(t)] = t (8)
The rst two conditions are standard. The third condition states that the discounted expected
utility of a marginal unit of liquid capital Lt must equal the marginal utility of an additional
unit of consumption. With probability (1 q(t)) liquid capital remains unmatched and is worth
VU (Ut+1;Kt+1) to the household, while with probability q(t) it is matched with a project and
turned into productive capital with marginal value VK(Ut+1;Kt+1). From the above Bellman
equation, we can derive these marginal values as
VU (Ut;Kt) = t (9)
VK(Ut;Kt) = t [t + '(1  )s] + (1  )(1  s)EtVK(Ut+1;Kt+1). (10)
3.3 Rental rate of capital and equilibrium
To close the model, we follow much of the labor search literature and assume that once matched,
households and rms determine the rental rate of capital by Nash bargaining over the surplus of
the match. The relevant surplus is the sum of marginal benets to each party: St = JK(Kt) +
Vk(Ut;Kt) VU (Ut;Kt)
t
. Dening  as the households relative bargaining power, the household thus
receives Vk(Ut;Kt) VU (Ut;Kt)t = St, while the rms share is JK(Kt) = (1   )St. After some
algebraic manipulations that are detailed in the appendix, we obtain the following expression
for the rental rate18
t = 

fK(XtNt;Kt) + (1  )(1  s) 
t

+ (1  )[ + (1  ')(1  )s]. (11)
The rst term in brackets is the maximum amount the rm is willing to pay per unit of capital.
It equals the marginal product of capital plus the average cost that is saved by entering the
proposed capital match rather than continuing to search. The second term in brackets is the
households opportunity cost of entering the proposed capital match, which equals the fraction
18The appendix is available on the authorswebsite (http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r16374)
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not lost to depreciation when capital remains liquid, , plus the deadweight loss in case the
capital gets separated (1  ')(1  )s.
As mentioned before, the constant-returns-to-scale assumption for technology implies that
all rms choose the same optimality conditions. The equilibrium of the economy is thus dened
by the system of equations (1)-(11) and the denition of aggregate dividends Dt = Yt WtNt 
tKt   Vt (see appendix for details). Dividends are positive because the search friction gives
rise to a surplus for each unit of matched capital that the rm and household split as specied
above.
3.4 Comparison with the RBC benchmark and qualitative considerations
In the following analysis, it will be useful to compare our capital search model with the RBC
benchmark where capital can be allocated costlessely and instantaneously (see for example
King and Rebelo, 2000). In fact, our model collapses to the RBC benchmark for the case
where the cost of project postings  and the deadweight loss from separations 1   ' are both
zero. Firms then post an innity of projects and all capital is reallocated in the beginning of
each period; i.e. s = 1; q(t) = 1 and Ut = 0. Under these assumptions, it can be shown
that the repayment on liquidity equals the marginal product of capital: t = fK(XtNt;Kt).
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Furthermore, choosing liquid capital Lt amounts to directly choosing the new stock of capital
Kt+1. This implies a value of matched liquidity VK(Ut;Kt) = t[t+(1 )], and the optimality
condition for the choice of liquidity (i.e. new investment) reduces to the standard Euler equation:
Ett+1[t+1 + (1   )] = t. Finally, by combining the households budget constraint with
the rms rst-order conditions and the capital accumulation equation, we recover the familiar
national accounting identity of the RBC benchmark Yt = Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt.
The national accounting identity of our capital search model is quite di¤erent. Specically,
the households budget constraint together with the denition of dividends yields
Yt = Ct + [Lt + Vt]  ['(1  )sKt + Ut]. (12)
The rst term in brackets on the right-hand side represents the total resources devoted to gross
investment by households and rms. The second term in brackets denotes idle capital in the
19The bargaining power  is irrelevant in this case because perfect competitition in the capital market draws
the surplus between rms and lenders to zero.
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form of newly separated capital and unmatched capital from the previous period. The di¤erence
between the two quantities denes net new investment. Idle capital thus drives a wedge in
the economys resource constraint that increases the amount e¤ectively made available to rms
without a¤ecting consumption. Akin to unemployment in models with labor market frictions,
the presence of these additional resources may magnify and prolong the economys reaction to
shocks.
The second potential source of internal propagation in our model is the state-dependent
nature of the search friction. In response to a persistent increase in aggregate productivity Xt,
the marginal value of future matched capital increases. By virtue of conditions (4) and (8),
rms and households thus nd it optimal to increase Vt and Lt, respectively. Which of the two
responses is larger depends on the exact specication of the model and thus, we cannot say
in general whether congestion in the physical capital market is procyclical or countercyclical.
However, by combining (4) and (8) with the denition of the division of the surplus, we can
show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 Congestion in the physical capital market dened as the ratio of liquidity to
project postings t  Lt=Vt is increasing in the expected growth rate of the marginal utility of
consumption.
Proof: see appendix. 
Under relatively weak conditions, this proposition implies that congestion is countercyclical,
as evidenced in the data. For example, if preferences are additive and concave in consumption,
t is inversely related to consumption growth. Since consumption reacts gradually to persistent
changes in aggregate productivity (e.g. Fig. 10 in King and Rebelo, 2000), congestion decreases
in business cycle upturns and inversely increases in downturns. This countercyclical behavior
of congestion has two e¤ects. First, capital stocks react proportionally more after impact than
if no search frictions were present. Second, the decrease in congestion implies that households
devote a relatively smaller share of their resources to liquid capital and consume relatively
more. As a result, the income e¤ect on labor supply is larger and depresses the response of
equilibrium hours on impact. But because the subsequent shift in labor demand is larger (as
capital stocks accumulate faster), equilibrium hours may respond more in the periods after the
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shock. These e¤ects together have the potential to generate amplied yet hump-shaped (i.e.
persistent) responses of hours and output to technology shocks.
4 Quantitative evaluation
We explore the quantitative implications of search frictions in the allocation of capital by com-
paring the business cycle performance of our capital matching model to the RBC benchmark in
terms of impulse response functions (IRFs) and unconditional second moments.
4.1 Shocks and functional forms
Following much of the RBC literature, we assume that the exogenous labor-augmenting shock
Xt has both a deterministic trend part Xt and a stochastic transitory part At. In particular
Xt  A1=(1 )t Xt. The deterministic trend part evolves according to Xt = g Xt 1, with g > 1,
and the stochastic transitory part evolves according to
logAt = A logAt 1 + "
A
t ;
with "At ~ (0; 
2
A).
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For household preferences, we follow King and Rebelos (2000) baseline specication and
dene the familys period utility as u(C; 1   N) = logC + !1  (1   N)1 . For production,
we assume a Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale of the form f(XN;K) =
A( XN)1 K with 0 <  < 1. Finally, we follow much of the labor search literature and
specify the matching technology as a Cobb-Douglas m(V;L) = V L1  with 0 <  < 1. This
constant returns to scale assumption implies that p(t) = tq(t), which turns out to simplify
the steady state computations in our model.
20The assumption of a deterministic trend in labor productivity implies that we need to normalize all aggregates
by Xt so as to obtain a stationary system that we then simulate using the log-linear rational expectations solution
algorithm of King and Watson (1998). We thank Bob King for providing us with the relevant Matlab code.
Alternatively, we could have specied a stochastic technology shock that is di¤erence stationary. Our results are
robust to such an alternative specication of the shock process.
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4.2 Calibration
We calibrate our model to U.S. quarterly data. For the parameters that are common with the
RBC benchmark, we use calibrations that are standard in the literature (e.g. King and Rebelo,
2000). We set g = 1:004 and  = 0:992 so as to match an annual mean trend growth rate of
1.6% and an average annual real yield on a riskless 3-month treasury bill of 4.95%. For the labor
supply, we x the parameter ! such that the average fraction of hours worked equals n = 0:2.
Together with  = 4, this results in a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1. Furthermore, we
set the share of capital in the production function to  = 1=3, and the rate of depreciation
of capital to  = 0:025. Finally, to calibrate the exogenous driving process for the temporary
technology shock, we extract a Solow residual from the data and then subtract a linear trend
with average growth rate g. Estimation of the above specied AR(1) process with this series
yields A = 0:979 and A = 0:0072.
For the non-standard parameters, we calibrate them to match long-run averages of gross
aggregate capital ows. Unfortunately, the U.S. National Production and Income Accounts
(NIPA) only measures investment ows of new capital goods and then infers aggregate capital
stock as the sum of current and past investment ows less depreciation.21 We thus need to look
at rm-level data of capital ows. One of the rst studies to do so is Ramey and Shapiro (1998)
who use Compustat data to compute gross capital additions and substractions of all publicly
traded rms in the U.S.22 For their full sample 1959-1995, Ramey and Shapiro thus nd that
annual gross ows of capital additions average 17.3% of depreciated capital stocks, with 70% of
these ows coming from expenditures in new property, plant and equipment (PP&E), 25% from
21 In particular, new investment ows are measured as the total value of shipments from capital goods producing
industries adjusted for imports and exports. See Becker et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion.
22Since Compustat covers publicly traded rms only, small and medium-size rms are likely to be underrep-
resented. It turns out, however, that as opposed to employment, most physical capital is concentrated in large
publicly held rms. Compustat data should still therefore provide a useful approximation. If at all, the reported
numbers understimate the extent of capital reallocation because smaller unlisted rms are more likely to un-
dergo major changes (merger/acquisition, bankruptcy, structural reorganization) and invest larger fractions in
used capital. See Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) for evidence. Also note that other rm-level surveys such as the
Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) or ACES may be more representative of the economy than Compustat.
At the same time, these surveys provide less detailed information on capital additions and substractions, span
over a smaller sample period and su¤er from their own selection problems (e.g. Becker et al., 2005).
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acquisitions of used capital, and the remaining 5% from entries of new rms. The aforementioned
study by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) broadly conrms these ndings. Based on a Compustat
sample from 1971 to 2000, they nd that reallocation of used capital makes up 24% of gross
investment and that the average annual gross investment rate equals 22% of depreciated capital
stocks.23
A second useful piece of information from the Compustat dataset are the direct measures
of separation ows. In Ramey and Shapiros study, for example, total separations make up
an annual average of 7.3% in terms of undepreciated capital and 4.8% in terms of depreciated
capital. By themselves, these numbers are not very revealing because depreciation during the life-
cycle of a capital unit is not captured by an actual outow of capital. What is more interesting
is the fraction of capital separations due to reasons other than depreciation. Here, Ramey
and Shapiro report that 71% come from retirements which we interpret as the nal step of
depreciation  21% come from sales, and the remaining 9% come from exits due to mergers
and bankruptcies. Hence, capital separations are an important phenomenon above and beyond
deprecation, with about 30% of all separations being due to reallocations to new rms.
Based on this evidence, we choose a quarterly separation rate of s = 0:01. Together with
 = 0:025, this calibration implies that 71% of all separations are due to depreciation and 29% are
due to sales and rm exits / acquisitions, as in Ramey and Shapiro (1998). Furthermore, using
the capital accumulation equation (1), we can derive that these calibrations imply a quarterly
steady state gross investment rate of
m(V;L)
K
= [g   (1  )(1  s)] = 0:03875,
which corresponds to a yearly rate of 15:5%. This number lies somewhat below the Compustat
evidence reported in Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006). One has
23Apart from the di¤erent sampling period, one of the reasons for the di¤erence in investment rates is that
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) use book values while Ramey and Shapiro (1998) apply articial price deators to
convert their capital measures to current costs that should reect changes in productive value. Furthermore,
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) measure reallocation indirectly as sales of PP&E plus acquisitions, while Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) measure reallocation directly as all additions of used capital. Both count purchases of existing
rms, however, arguing that mergers and acquisitions not only represent a change of ownership but often involve
important modications to the composition and use of existing capital. See Jovanovic and Rousseau (2004) for a
similar argument.
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to keep in mind, however, that the gross investment rates in these two studies are likely to be
exaggerated because part of the depreciation applied to capital stocks in Compustat represents
accounting standards rather than actual decreases in the value-of-use. Finally, we set ' = 0:95
such that investment in used capital as a fraction of gross investment, '(1  )s, coincides with
the 24 _% reported by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
Consider next the steady state probability of capital allocation q. On the one hand, we know
from Section 2 that the hazard rate for di¤erent (relatively liquid) nished capital goods averages
q = 0:86. On the other hand, the vacancy rates for (less liquid) leased industrial and o¢ ce space
average 9.5% and 14.5% of total space, respectively. Dening the corresponding vacancy rate in
our model as U=(U +K) = (1   q)L=(U +K) and remembering that gross investment equals
m(V;L) = qL, we can back out an average q. For the above gross rate of 0:03875 , we obtain
q = 0:27 if we use the vacancy rate of o¢ ce space and q = 0:19 if we use the industrial vacancy
rate. These numbers suggest that the average hazard rate is very di¤erent for di¤erent used and
new capital goods. For the purpose of our model, we choose an average value of q = 0:5.
The remaining parameters to consider are the households bargaining weight  and the
elasticity of the matching function . It turns out that  does not a¤ect any of the steady state
values. Furthermore, we have no particular long-run information to tie down  . In what follows,
we set  = 0:5 and  = 0:5 and check afterwards whether the results are robust to alternative
values.
4.3 Results
Panel A of Figure 1 plots the IRFs of output, productive capital and hours to a persistent, tem-
porary technology shock for both our capital search model (solid lines) and the RBC benchmark
(dotted lines). Panel B plots the IRFs of variables that are specic to our capital search model.
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Figure 2: IRFs to a persistent technology shock for baseline specication
Consider rst Panel B. In response to the technology shock, households devote more resources
to liquidity and rms open up more vacancies. Hence, both total gross investment m(Lt; Vt)
and net new investment It = [Lt + Vt]   ['(1   )sKt + Ut] increase (since Kt and Ut are
predetermined). Furthermore, since preferences are additive and concave in consumption and
the technology shock is persistent, congestion in the capital market t = Lt=Vt decreases by
proposition 1. For the rst few periods after the shock, this decrease in congestion in the capital
market leads to a proportionally more important response of capital stocks than in the RBC
benchmark. Yet, as Panel A of Figure 1 shows, the di¤erence is quantitatively negligible and
its e¤ect on output is dwarfed by the smaller response of hours. This latter result is due to the
larger income e¤ect on labor supply as the decrease in congestion lets the households devote
more resources to consumption. Overall, output thus responds slightly less than in the RBC
benchmark.
As we document in the appendix, the lack of internal propagation of the capital search model
is robust to alternative calibrations of q, ',  and .24 The principal reason for this result is
that capital separation and allocation ows implied by our calibration of  and s are too small
24 Interestingly, an increase in the deadweight loss 1   ' slightly decreases the internal amplication of the
model, thus replicating the result in Veracierto (2002, Table 1) that capital irreversibilities dampen rather than
increase output uctuations.
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for the countercyclical congestion mechanism to have a sizable e¤ect. To illustrate this point,
we resimulate the model with a much larger separation rate of s = 0:15. This would have
the counterfactual implication that almost 70% of all capital leaves production in each year
(including depreciation) and that average investment ows are equally important. We simply
choose this calibration here for expositional purposes and to draw a comparison with Andolfatto
(1996) who calibrates his labor search model to the same quarterly separation rate of s = 0:15.25
As Figure 3 shows, when separation and investment ows are much larger, the countercyclical
congestion mechanism starts to matter.
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Figure 3: IRFs to a persistent technology shock for counterfactually high separation rate
Panel B explains the origin of these changes. Liquid capital Lt now hardly increases while the
jump of project postings Vt is almost as large as before. Hence, the drop in congestion is more
important, which explains why capital stocks now respond almost twice as much in the periods
following the shock than in the RBC benchmark. Furthermore, households devote a propor-
tionally larger share to consumption on impact, which result is an amplied and humpshaped
25For his calibration, Andolfatto (1996) nds that search frictions in the labor market yield signicant output
persistence in response to technology shocks. Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) argue, however, that when
the separation rate is calibrated to the more reasonable value of 10% per quarter, most of these e¤ects disappear
as long as separations are constant over the cycle (see their footnote 22). This is an interesting analogue to the
point made here.
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response of hours. The consequence is an amplied and more persistent reaction of output.
To sum up the quantitative evaluation, Table 2 compares the unconditional standard devia-
tion of Hodrick-Prescott ltered output and autocorrelations of unltered output growth of our
capital search model with U.S. data and the RBC benchmark.
Table 2: Unconditional second moments of baseline capital search model
U.S. data RBC benchmark Capital search
s = 0:01 s = 0:15
(y) 1.66 1.17 1.16 1.22
corr(y;y 1) 0.264 0.004 0.010 0.102
corr(y;y 2) 0.227 0.003 0.005 0.035
corr(y;y 3) 0.057 0.002 0.003 0.010
Notes: Standard deviation of output is H-P ltered; autocorrelations of growth rates are
unltered. U.S. data are from DRI Economics for 1953:2 - 2001:4 (see appendix for details).
As discussed in King and Rebelo (2000), the benchmark RBC model is incapable of gener-
ating sizable amplication of the exogenous technology shock and remains below the standard
deviation reported in the data despite the counterfactually large uctuations in the exogenous
technology shock. Likewise, as Cogley and Nason (1995) document, the RBC model fails to
generate the sizable positive autocorrelation of output growth over several quarters that we
observe in the data. Our capital search model when appropriately calibrated fails equally
to generate internal amplication and persistence. The principal reason is that separation and
reallocation ows are too small for the countercyclical congestion of our model to have sizable
e¤ects. In this sense, the proposed search friction for capital allocation has similarly negligible
general equilibrium e¤ects than models with adjustment costs on investment (e.g. Cogley and
Nason, 1995 or more recently Khan and Thomas, 2006a) or time-to-build delays (e.g. Kydland
and Prescott, 1982) even though the qualitative implications of our model are quite di¤erent.
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5 Endogenous capital separations due to credit frictions
Di¤erent empirical measures suggest that credit frictions and thus capital separations due to
nancial distress are countercyclical. Covas and Den Haan (2006), for example, document that
default rates for U.S corporate bonds peak at the end of recessions. Likewise, we nd that current
liabilities of business failures taken from DRI (mnemonic: fail) are countercyclical.26 Parallel to
Den Haan, Ramey and Watsons (2000) argument that countercyclical job destruction implies
substantial propagation in a labor search model, this suggests that extending our baseline model
with credit frictions such as to generate countercyclical capital separations may, in fact, help
our capital search model to generate more important business cycle e¤ects.
As a by-product, the extension also allows us to assess the role of costly capital reallocation
for the business cycle e¤ects of credit frictions. In fact, existing DGE models with credit frictions
such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, CF henceforth) or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999,
BGG henceforth) exclusively focus on the e¤ects of net worth on investment and output. But
since factors of production in these models can be moved costlessely from one rm to another,
they abstract by denition from the e¤ects of capital reallocation due to nancial distress.
5.1 Model extension
As in CF and BGG, we introduce credit frictions through a costly state verication (CSV)
mechanism originally proposed by Townsend (1979). Firms are subject to a idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock that households (the capital lenders) can only observe after paying a monitoring
cost. This assumption of asymmetric information implies that in the absence of monitoring, the
rm would always want to underreport its productivity so as to avoid payment of the previously
agreed upon rental rate. Households solve this agency problems with a debt contract that spec-
ies monitoring and default if the idiosyncratic productivity level of the rm falls below some
optimal threshold.
While we follow the same CSV approach, our model di¤ers from CF and BGG in three
important details. First, the optimal default threshold in our model is below the one in CF
26The H-P ltered contemporaneous correlation of Covas and Den Haans (2006) default rate with real GDP is
-0.33 for the period 1971-2004, and -0.77 for the period 1986-2004. The H-P ltered correlation coe¢ cient of our
liabilities series with real GDP is -0.33 for the sample 1948-1998 and -0.27 for the sample 1980-1998.
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and BGG because capital reallocation is costly in our model while in CF and BGG, it is not.
Second, we assume as in the baseline model that rms transfer all of their prots to households
at the end of the period. Hence, net worth the channel through which credit frictions a¤ect
investment in CF and BGG is absent. Third, we retain the assumption that the rental rate is
determined so as to split the surplus of the lending relationship. CF and BGG assume instead
that the lending market is perfectly competitive and thus, all of the surplus goes to the rm.
The specics of the extended model are as follows. The representative rms technology
becomes
Yt = atf(XtNt;Kt), (13)
where f(XtNt;Kt) describes the same constant-returns-to-scale function as before, and at de-
notes the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. Contrary to the aggregate shock
Xt, which is known to all participants at the beginning of the period, the shock at occurs after
all optimal decisions have taken place and is only observed by the rm. As in CF and BGG, we
assume that at is independently and identically distributed over time and follows a lognormal
distribution log(a)  N( 
2
log(a)
2 ; 
2
log(a)) so as to ensure at 2 [0;1] and E(a) = 1.27
To deal with the asymmetric information about rm productivity, households and rms
negotiate the rental rate t per unit of matched capital prior to the realization of at. If the
rm makes positive prots (i.e. if at  at where at is such that atf (XtNt;Kt)   WtNt 
tKt   Vt = 0), the rm pays tKt, the household refrains from monitoring and the capital
match continues. If, on the other hand, at < at the rm is unable to pay the negotiated
capital rental because we assume that the wage bill WtNt and the cost of posting vacancies
Vt need to be covered rst in order for the rm to continue operating next period. In this
situation, the household pays the monitoring cost to verify the rms production and decides on
the continuation of the capital match. If at is above some optimal threshold at that we derive
below, the household takes all of the rms production and covers for the totality of WtNt and
Vt so as to continue the capital match. If instead at is below the threshold at, the household
separates the match and takes back its capital stock without receiving nor paying anything. In
27The assumption that at is independently and identically distributed in conjunction with constant-returns-to-
scale technology simplies the analysis as we do not need to consider the history of shocks incurred by each rm.
Firm size thus remains irrelevant, which is why our notation continues to abstract from rm subscripts.
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this case, the rm is liquidated and the di¤erence between production and the cost of WtNt and
Vt is picked up by an insurance that is funded with the dividends from prot-making rms.28
Given these assumptions, endogenous separations set due to nancial distress are dened as
set = H(at);
where H(a) denotes the cumulative density of a. Aside from this endogenous part, we still allow
for exogenous (constant) separations that we denote by sx. Hence, the total separation rate is
dened as
st = s
x + set . (14)
Furthermore, the households expected gross revenue from matched capital equals
RKt =
Z 1
at
tKtdH(a) +
Z at
at
[af(XtNt;Kt) WtNt   Vt] dH(a) (15)
 
Z at
0
[af(XtNt;Kt)] dH(a) + (1  )'tstKt.
The rst two terms denote net revenues from continuing relationships. The third term denotes
the expected total monitoring cost paid by the household, which we assume to be a xed propor-
tion  > 0 of the defaulting rmsoutput. The fourth term corresponds to the value of separated
capital returned to the households budget constraint. In this last term, we assume that the
recovery rate of separated capital 't is time-varying and more specically, that it is a convex
function of total endogenous capital separations; i.e. 't = &(s
e
t ) with &
0() < 0 and & 00() < 0.
Two considerations motivate this choice. First, we want to capture industry-specic asset illiq-
uidity as proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) that are otherwise absent in our representative
agent model (see discussion in Section 2). Second, the additional exibility a¤orded by this
function allows us to match the business cycle dynamics of endogenous capital separations due
to nancial distress.
Consider now the households optimal choice of at. It obtains for the level of at below which
renancing a rm is more expensive than severing the lending relationship and incurring the cost
of reallocating the capital to another rm. More formally, we can derive it from the households
28See the appendix for the details on this insurance. Su¢ ce to say here that we implicitly assume that rms or
capital lenders on their own cannot contract a similar insurance on their own to prevent the rm from disappearing.
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optimization problem as (see the appendix for a detailed description)
t(1  )'tKt = t [atf(XtNt;Kt) WtNt   Vt] + (1  )KtEtVK(Ut+1;Kt+1): (16)
The left-hand side is the marginal value (in utility terms) of separating and returning the cap-
ital unit into the budget constraint for reallocation, where we assume that the representative
household takes 't as exogenous. The right-hand side is the marginal revenue from matched
capital plus the marginal value of continuing the match into the future.29
Conditional on selecting a debt contract, the proposed monitoring and separation scheme is
optimal for both parties. The rm would not gain anything from reporting output below what
it actually produced because in case of monitoring, it will loose all output anyway. Likewise,
the household would not gain anything from negotiating a higher or lower auditing cuto¤ at or
a separation threshold at; by denition of the utility-maximizing condition in (16).
Since any revenues associated with productivity shocks below at are absorbed either by the
capital lender (in case of continuation of the capital match) or by an insurance (in case of
capital separation), rms now maximize only over the positive portion of revenue net of current
costs; i.e.
R1
at
[af(XtNt;Kt)  tKt  WtNt   Vt] dH(a): As the appendix details, the rst-
order conditions resulting from this objective function would imply substantial overhiring of
labor relative to the RBC benchmark and thus an unrealistically high labor share. We correct
this implication by assuming, in addition, that the representative rm in the extended model
applies a constant markup 1=  1 on its optimal decision problem.30
To close the model, we assume as before that the rental rate is determined by Nash bargaining
over the surplus of the capital relationship. This rental rate is now conditional on the optimal
29 It can be shown that atf(XtNt;Kt) < WtNt + Vt ; i.e. the household is willing to renance distressed rms
up to a certain point so as to continue the capital match. This is because walking away from a relationship to
reallocate capital with another rm is costly in the sense that separated capital yields zero return in the next
period and comes with the risk that rematching takes time. By contrast, lenders in the CF and BGG models
never renance since liquidating a defaulting rm and reallocating the capital is costless.
30As proposed by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), such a markup could result from a situation where otherwise
identical rms produce imperfectly substitutable goods such that each rm faces a downward-sloping demand in
its relative price.
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at (see appendix)
t = 

t fK(XtNt;Kt) + (1  )(1  st)

t
[1 H(at)]

+ (1  ) [ + (1  )(1  't)st]
+
h
tH(at)  (1  )(t   t   (1  t))fK(XtNt;Kt)
i
; (17)
where 
t
=
R1
at
adH(a) and t =
R1
at
adH(a) denote partial expectations. Compared to the
case with exogenous separation, the rst term in brackets is altered to reect the marginal
product of capital and the saved search costs actually accruing to the rm. The third term
in brackets represents the risk premium that arises because households do not receive the full
contractual payment t (or even need to reinject money) and pay monitoring costs when the
rms idiosyncratic shock drops below at.31
5.2 Calibration
To compare the extended model with the baseline model where all separations are constant, we
keep the common parameters unchanged in a rst time; i.e. q = 0:5, s = 0:01,  = 0:5; and
 = 0:5. Further below, we perform robustness checks with respect to alternative calibrations.
The additional parameters requiring calibration are the markup of price over marginal cost,
1= , the fraction of output expended on monitoring,  , the fraction of capital separation due to
nancial distress, se=s, and the elasticity (@'=@se)=(se=') around steady state.32
The crucial dimensions we want to match with our calibration are the relative importance and
business cycle dynamics of capital separations due to nancial distress. Since the aforementioned
studies on rm-level capital ows do not report such details, we compute the relevant series
ourselves from Compustat data (see appendix for a detailed description of the data). Specically,
we treat the following categories as capital separations due to nancial distress: (i) exits due to
liquidation (chapter 7); (ii) sales during the years (-1 0 1 2) around bankruptcy lings (chapter
11); and (iii) sales during the years (-1 0 1 2) around drops of more than 2 credit ratings in
long term debt. Compustat provides information on the reasons of exit for disappearing rms
31Broadly speaking, this risk premium is the consequence of incomplete contracting in a world with ex-post
factor specicity that Williamson (1979) and more recently Caballero and Hammour (1996) term the fundamental
transformation problem. The general equilibrium consquence is reduced exibility of separation decisions and, in
turn, a slower capital accumulation process.
32Since we loglinearize the model, the other functional characteristics of ' = g(se) are irrelevant.
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as well as information about debt ratings of continuing rms. To identify rm bankruptcies,
we link the Compustat database with information on chapter 11 lings from the Bankruptcy
Research Database.33 Total separations (dened as sales and exits) and retirements, in turn,
are computed as in Ramey and Shapiro (1998).34 Table 3 provides the thus computed averages
for the sample 1980-1993.35
Table 3: Capital separations
Retirements Sales Exits S & E S & E due to
(S) (E) Total Fin. Distress
Fraction of PP&E 4.94% 1.31% 1.11% 2.42% 0.15%
Correlation with output 0.30 0.48 0.37 0.15 -0.31
Standard dev rel output 21.82 4.82 99.5 39.52 2.46
Notes: Standard deviations and correlation coe¢ cients apply to H-P ltered series;
Data source from Compustat 1980-1993 (see appendix for details).
In line with Ramey and Shapiro (1998), retirements make up roughly two thirds of all
separations while sales and exits make up about one third.36 Sales and exits due to nancial
distress make up only 6% of total capital separations (and only 4.6% for the 1980-2004 period),
which amounts to 0.15% of average capital stocks. The series is countercyclical, in line with the
aforementioned evidence on the cyclicality of nancial distress, and about two and a half times
as volatile as output. To roughly match these characteristics, we calibrate se=s = 0:05 and set
33The Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD) is compiled by Lynn M. LoPucki from UCLA Law. Of the 751
reported cases of bankruptcy lings by large publicly traded rms since October 1979, we were able to match 623
rms with the unique rm identiers used by Compustat (mnemonic: gvkey).
34Ramey and Shapiro (1998) count as total exits the ones related to mergers and liquidations but do not count
exits due to privatizations, leveraged buyouts and other reasons.
35We start the sample only in 1980 because, as Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006) document, the
proportion of medium-size and smaller rms listed publicly increased importantly in the early 1980s. This makes
the Compustat sample more representative  especially with regards exits due to nancial distress. The end
date 1993 is chosen because thereafter, rms no longer provide accurate numbers for retirements. As mentioned
before, Compustat data should be more representative for capital than for employment because physical capital
is concentrated in large rms, most of which are publicly traded (e.g. Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007).
36As discussed before, the total numbers are small because depreciation during the life-cycle of a capital unit
is not matched by an actual outow of capital.
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(@'=@se)=(se=') such that the relative volatility of se in the model coincides with the one in
the data.
For the other two additional parameters, we choose 1= = 1=0:8 = 25% and set the moni-
toring cost parameter to  = 0:05.37. The resulting long-run ratios of interest are the following:
the consumption-output ratio equals 73:13%, which is in line with King and Rebelo (2000); the
labor share equals 74%, which corresponds to estimates reported by Gollin (2002); the average
annualized risk premium equals 3:56%, which lies in-between the spread of the post-war average
Aaa corporate bond yield over the 3-month Treasury bill (1.87%) and the post-war average
equity risk premium for the U.S. (7.58%); and prots (dividends) relative to output equal 8:9%,
which is somewhat too high compared to the evidence reported in Basu and Fernald (1997).38
Before continuing, we return to Table 4 to consider the overall behavior of sales and exits.
Both series are procyclical and especially exits are highly volatile relative to output. This latter
result is due to the large variations in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that account for most
of capital separations in the Compustat data.39 Somewhat counterfactually, we omit these
variations in our extended model and instead assume this part of capital separations to be
constant. The reason for this omission is two-fold. First, as the below quantitative analysis
shows, even small countercyclical capital separations due to credit frictions can have substantial
e¤ects in general equilibrium. Second, the procyclical nature of sales and M&A is likely to be
the result of reallocation towards more e¢ cient rms in the wake of technological change (e.g.
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2004). Our representative agent framework is designed, by denition, to
quantify the e¤ects of search frictions on their own but does not allow us to consider reallocation
costs in conjunction with persistent productivity di¤erences. As we discuss in the conclusion of
37A great deal of controversy surrounds the costs related to bankruptcy. In our model, this cost should only
entail the direct costs related to monitoring and reorganization. We therefore set it to a value that is well below
estimates of direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy that seem to lie between 20 and 35% of output. See Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) for a discussion. As robustness checks in the appendix reveal, the value of  has little inuence
on the dynamics of our model.
38Other values of interest implied by our calibration but for which we do not have any empirical counterparts
are: an average cost of posting vacancies relative to output equal to v=y = 2:22%, and a standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic productivity shock equal to a = 0:33.
39The procyclicality of M&A is consistent with evidence reported in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001). They use
LRD data and nd that change in ownership of large manufacturing plants is highly procyclical.
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the paper, this is an interesting avenue for future research.
5.3 Quantitative evaluation
As in Section 4, we start our quantitative evaluation by considering IRFs to a persistent but
temporary technology shock. As is immediately apparent from Figure 3, the extended capital
matching model (solid lines) generates a substantially amplied response of output and hours
compared to the RBC benchmark (dotted lines).
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Figure 3: IRFs to a persistent technology shock for the extended model
The amplication has its origin in the state-dependent nature of the credit friction. To
illustrate this, Figure 4 displays the IRFs of the variables related to changes in the stock of capital
entering the production function. The positive technology shock shifts the rmsproductivity
distribution to the right, which means that bankruptcies and thus capital separations drop (top-
right panel). Hence, less capital is separated from production and returned to the households
budget constraint for time-consuming rematching. This explains why productive capital stocks
react more strongly than in the RBC benchmark.
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Figure 4: IRFs to a persistent technology shock for the extended model.
As an indirect e¤ect of the drop in capital separations, households now nd it optimal to
allocate more resources to new investment than in the baseline model with constant separations.
Compared to the RBC model, consumption thus reacts less on impact, which results in a smaller
income e¤ect on labor supply. In addition, the more important reaction of productive capital
implies that the marginal product of labor and thus labor demand increases more rapidly in the
periods after the shock than in the RBC model. The conjunction of these two general equilibrium
e¤ects leads to a substantially larger response of equilibrium hours and, as the ensuing analysis
reveals, this is what explains most of the increased internal amplication of output relative to
the RBC benchmark.
Table 4 presents prominent unconditional second moments for U.S. postwar data, the RBC
benchmark, the baseline capital search model with exogenous separations as well as the extended
capital search model with endogenous separation. For this last case, we report two cases: one
for  = 0:5, as used so far, and one for  = 0:25. As we will see, the calibration of this parameter
now has important implications.
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Table 4: Second moments for baseline calibration
U.S data RBC Capital search
benchmark Exogenous Endogenous
 = 0:5  = 0:25
a b a b a b a b a b
c 0.58 0.69 0.45 0.96 0.48 0.97 0.31 -0.38 0.33 0.85
n 0.95 0.87 0.29 0.97 0.27 0.98 0.63 0.97 0.40 0.97
k - - 0.28 0.10 0.28 0.14 0.30 0.44 0.25 0.10
i 2.89 0.87 2.68 0.99 2.68 0.99 2.14 0.99 2.53 0.99
se 2.46 -0.96 - - - - 2.46 -0.96 2.46 -0.96
premium 0.54 -0.59 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.98 0.10 -0.97 0.03 -0.97
(y) 1.66 1.17 1.16 1.71 1.28
Notes: (a) Standard deviation relative to output; (b) contemporaneous correlation
with output. All moments are Hodrick-Prescott ltered. Data source from DRI
Basic Economics 1953:2-2001:4 (see appendix for details).
Consider rst the case where  = 0:5. As indicated by the IRFs, this version of the extended
model generates substantial amplication of output relative to the RBC benchmark. As for per-
sistence, however, the model still fails to generate the marked positive autocorrelation of output
growth that we see in the data (see Table 5 below). The increase in internal amplication is
rooted in the general equilibrium e¤ects on labor supply and labor demand that result in more
volatile dynamics of hours. Interestingly, both the zero prot threshold at and the separation
threshold at are countercyclical, which implies, in turn, that the model generates a countercycli-
cal risk premium. Although the uctuations of this premium are not as volatile in the data, this
result is a signicant success of our extended model over the RBC benchmark as well as over
standard credit friction models without costly capital reallocation (see below).
Closer inspection of Table 4 reveals that the more volatile dynamics of equilibrium hours
come at the cost of countercyclical consumption, which is clearly at odds with the data. In fact,
the negative income e¤ect brought about by the drop in capital separations is so strong that
households choose to decrease their consumption on impact. These consumption dynamics hinge
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crucially on the elasticity  that links the matching probability q(t) to the congestion measure
t.40 For  = 0:5, the response of q(t) is relatively large. We thus recalibrate  = 0:25 so as to
roughly match the consumption dynamics in the data. The last column of Table 4 reports the
results. Consumption is now procyclical and almost as volatile as in the data. The consequence
of this adjustment is a much smaller income e¤ect on labor supply, which reduces the standard
deviation of output to 1.28 a value just slightly above the RBC benchmark.
This exercise makes clear that the interplay between time-consuming capital (re-)allocation
and countercyclical capital separation leads to amplication by a¤ecting the response of hours
supplied by households. Exogenous shocks not only a¤ect the factor productivity as in the
RBC benchmark, but also the stock of productive capital and the amount of resources that
need to go through the time-consuming allocation process. The time-varying capital separation
rate limits the income e¤ect of rising returns to capital, thus inducing households to shift more
resources away from consumption towards investment and supplying more hours. However, once
we calibrate the model to yield reasonable consumption dynamics, we nd that these e¤ects are
modest and result only in a small increase in internal amplication.
5.4 Assessing the e¤ect of removing search frictions
To further illustrate the interplay between search frictions and countercyclical capital separa-
tions, we remove the search friction from the model. As in the RBC benchmark, this corresponds
to a situation where  = 0 and 't = 1. Firms thus post an innity of new projects in every
period and the probability of allocating a liquid unit of capital to a rm becomes q(t) = 1.
Households still monitor rms that cannot make the negotiated rental payment and separate
the lending relationship with rms whose revenues fall below their wage bill. In other words,
households are no longer willing to reinject funds to keep a lending relationship alive because
reallocating capital is now costless. Despite this change in optimal separation decision, the rental
rate still involves a risk premium that takes into account the expected cost of monitoring.41 As
40Recall from the rst order condition (8) that the expected return from liquid capital is an average of the
marginal values of matched and unmatched capital, weighted by the matching probability q(): A stronger cyclical
response of q() means the average return to liquid capital rises more quickly in an upturn.
41Specically, we derive the intertemporal Euler equation as (see appendix for details)
t = Et [t+1	t+1fk(Xt+1Nt+1;Kt+1) + (1  )] ,
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in CF and BGG, this risk premium a¤ects the price of capital and thus investment.
Table 5 provides unconditional second moments for the extended model without search fric-
tions and contrasts them to the baseline model with both frictions and the RBC benchmark.
To put these results in perspective, we report the same summary statistics for a non-monetary
version of the BGG model as well as the CF model.42
Table 5: Comparison of second moments when frictions are removed
Extended model Extended model RBC BGG CF
with both frictions without search benchmark
(y) 1.28 1.20 1.17 1.1 1.1
corr(se; y) -0.96 -0.72 - 0.47 0.32
corr(premium; y) -0.97 -0.93 0.98 -0.03 0.32
corr(y;y 1) -0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.01 0.2
corr(y;y 2) -0.004 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.02
corr(y;y 3) -0.005 0 0.002 0.003 0.01
Notes: Standard deviation of output is Hodrick-Prescott ltered.
Autocorrelations of growth rates are unltered
The extended model without search frictions generates less internal amplication than the
model with both frictions. The reason for this decrease of internal amplication is that separated
capital can now be reallocated costlessely and immediately. The only thing that sets apart the
extended model without search frictions from the RBC benchmark is the countercyclical risk
premium. After a positive shock, this premium decreases in our model because less rms are
expected to default. This leads to a slightly more important investment boom at the expense
of consumption. The resulting smaller income e¤ect on labor supply implies that equilibrium
hours and thus output react more than in the RBC model. However, this di¤erence is minimal.
where 	t+1 =
h
 t+1 + (t+1   t+1)  (1  t+1)
i
denotes the risk premium (which depends on conditional
expectations t+1 and t+1 associated with the monitoring and separation thresholds, and the optimal separation
threshold is now determined by atf(XtNt;Kt)   WtNt = 0): In the RBC benchmark without credit market
frictions, by contrast, the marginal product of capital equals Etft+1 [fK(Xt+1Nt+1;Kt+1) + 1  ]g = t.
42Details about the BGG model and the CF model, including their calibration, are provided to the interested
reader upon request.
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Compared to the BGG model and the CF model, our extended model with credit frictions
succeeds in generating countercyclical default and countercyclical risk premia, independent of
whether the search friction is present or not.43 This di¤erence is due to the absence of net worth
in our model.44 As shown in Covas and Den Haan (2006), rms in the BGG and CF models seek
to increase their capital immediately in response to a positive technology shock even though
their net worth adjusts only sluggishly. The resulting increase in their debt to net worth ratio
implies that monitoring by lenders in an upturn actually increases, which in turn pushes up the
external nance premium. This implies an increase in the monitoring and separation threshold,
thus exerting upward pressure on the risk premium.
5.5 Volatility of separations and robustness to alternative calibrations
As highlighted by the above results, a crucial ingredient for the marked internal propagation of
our extended model is the income e¤ect on labor supply whereby households withhold current
consumption to nance capital investments. The following robustness checks assess to what
extent alternative calibrations a¤ect the performance of the model. In all of these exercises,
we keep  = 0:25 so as to roughly match the consumption dynamics in the data and adjust
the elasticity (@'=@se)=(se=') such as to keep the relative volatility of se consistent with the
Compustat data. Table 6 reports the results.
43 Interestingly, both the BGG and CF model generate somewhat less amplied output dynamics with respect
to technology shocks than the RBC benchmark. Meier and Muller (2005), Queijo (2006) and Christensen and Dib
(2007) conrm these ndings in more elaborate DGE models. The net worth channel may, however, have more
important e¤ects with respect to other shocks. Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) nd, for example, that
net worth can play an important role in a small open economy that combines liquidity shocks (i.e. an exogenous
change to the foreign borrowing premium) with exchange rate targeting monetary policy. Furthermore, note that
the CF model succeeds in generating some persistence in output growth. The reason for this result is that the CF
model applies the credit friction only to the investment goods producing sector whereas the BGG model applies
the friction to the entire economy.
44Another di¤erence is that in the BGG and CF models, lenders who sever the nancing relationship can walk
away with any revenue net of wage payments whereas in our model, this is not the case. This is why the monitoring
threshold coincides with the separation threshold in the BGG and CF models; i.e. there is no chapter 11.
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Table 6: Sensitivity of model performance to alternative calibrations
Baseline Mean allocation rate Bargaining power Separation rates
calibration q() = 0:25 q() = 0:75  = 0:45  = 0:75 se=s = 0:01 s = 0:02
(y) 1.28 1.29 1.28 1.28 1.26 1.29 1.62
(se)=(y) 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46
corr(se; y) -0.96 -0.97 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.97
corr(y;y 1) -0.004 -0.017 0.010 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.004
corr(y;y 2) -0.004 -0.013 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.01
corr(y;y 3) -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.016
Notes: Standard deviations and cross-correlations are Hodrick-Prescott ltered.
Autocorrelations of growth rates are unltered.
Changes in q () ;  and se=s (keeping s = 0:01) have essentially no impact on the dynamics
of the model.45 This result would even hold if we didnt adjust (@'=@se)=(se=') so as to keep
(se)=(y) = 2:46. The reason for this robustness is that income e¤ects on labor supply remain
small when  = 0:25 and capital separations on their own are too insignicant to a¤ect output
signicantly.
The dynamics of the model are more sensitive to changes in the average separation rate
s. For example, when we calibrate s = 0:02 per quarter (keeping se=s at 0:05), the standard
deviation of output rises to (y) = 1:62. The mechanism for this increase in amplication is
the same than before. The larger average s implies that the drop in separated capital after a
positive technology shock is more important and thus, households divert more resources away
from consumption in order to achieve the desired amount of liquid capital. The resulting negative
income e¤ect increases the volatility of hours, thus leading to an amplied output response. As
before, however, this e¤ect is accompanied by a negative correlation of consumption with output.
If we correct this counterfactual implication by lowering  even more, the amplication of output
is reduced substantially.
Finally, it is interesting to note that there are several calibrations for which the extended cap-
ital search model generates both important amplication and persistence e¤ects. For example, if
45For the given calibration, there is no rational expectations solution to the model for values of  below 0:45:
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we set the elasticity (@'=@se)=(se=') = 0 (i.e. ' is constant) and  = 0:5, we obtain (y) = 1:52,
corr(y;y 1) = 0:28 and corr(y;y 2) = 0:08 without counterfactual consumption dynam-
ics (see appendix for details). This marked improvement in internal propagation is due to an
overly volatile endogenous separation rate (more than a 1000 times as volatile than output).
This illustrates that the combination of search frictions for physical capital and countercyclical
capital separations due to credit frictions leads at least in principle to more important business
cycle uctuations. The issue is simply that the ows of physical capital in and out of production
are not large and not volatile enough for these e¤ects to play a substantial role.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the business cycle consequences of search frictions for the allocation
of physical capital. The investigation is motivated by rm- and industry-level evidence on market
imperfections in the allocation of physical capital. Despite the fundamentally di¤erent nature
of physical capital and labor, we argue that the market imperfections involved in the allocation
of these two factors are quite similar. We thus consider our paper as a rst step towards
analyzing capital allocation with the same type of search frictions that have proven fruitful for
our understanding of labor markets. By the same token, we propose a complementary view to
existing models of investment that focus on aggregate adjustment costs and building delays in
a world with perfect markets.
The capital search model that we develop generates countercyclical congestion in physical
capital markets, in line with the data. Our analysis in a modern DGE context suggests, however,
that for reasonable calibrations, the internal propagation e¤ects of these search frictions are
modest. The main reason for this lack of internal propagation is quantitative: separation and
reallocation ows of physical capital are too small for the search friction to play a signicant role.
This conclusion remains intact when we extend the model with credit market frictions that result
in countercyclical capital separations. While the combination of countercyclical separations and
imperfect capital (re-) allocation increases internal propagation, almost all of these e¤ects stem
from a general equilibrium income e¤ect that these frictions have on labor supply. Once we tie
down the model to generate consumption dynamics in line with the data, we nd that capital
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separations due to nancial distress are simply not important and volatile enough for them to
generate signicant internal propagation.
Our results provide an interesting contrast to Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) who
show that the introduction of countercyclical job destruction in a labor search model substan-
tially magnies and prolongs the business cycle e¤ects of small shocks. This di¤erence in results
is mainly due to the fact that labor is twice as important of an input to production as capital
and that job destructions uctuate on average much more over the business cycle than capital
separations. Furthermore, job destructions overall are countercyclical while for capital separa-
tions, only the part linked to nancial distress is countercyclical. This part makes up only a
small fraction of all capital reallocations, which explains why its impact is so limited.
The comparison suggest that capital reallocations due to sales and M&A are a more im-
portant source of internal propagation. From our rm-level data, we know that most capital
reallocations occur through these two channels and are substantially more volatile than capital
reallocations due to nancial distress. The problem is that sales and M&A are procyclical rather
than countercyclical and thus, they would not generate more important business cycle dynamics
in the proposed representative agent framework. At the same time, Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2004) argue that sales and M&A of capital are often the consequence of reorganization in the af-
termath of embodied technological progress. Hence, combining embodied technological progress
in a heterogenous rm framework with search frictions for the reorganization of physical capi-
tal could entail important internal propagation e¤ects as it takes time for rms and sectors to
reallocate factors of production to their most productive use.46
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